



VILLAGE OF PALMETTO BAY

Mayor Shelley Stanczyk  
Vice Mayor Brian W. Pariser  
Council Member Patrick Fiore  
Council Member Howard Tendrich  
Council Member Joan Lindsay

Village Manager Ron E. Williams  
Village Attorney Eve A. Boutsis  
Village Clerk Meighan J. Alexander

In accordance with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, persons needing special accommodation, a sign language interpreter or hearing impaired to participate in this proceeding should contact the Village Clerk at (305) 259-1234 for assistance no later than four days prior to the meeting.

VILLAGE LOCAL PLANNING AGENCY MEETING AGENDA

Monday, February 6, 2012 - 7:00 P.M.

(To immediately precede Regular Council Meeting)

Village Hall

9705 E. Hibiscus Street

(305) 259-1234

1. **CALL TO ORDER, ROLL CALL, PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE**
2. **ORDINANCE FOR SECOND READING (PUBLIC HEARING)**
  - A. AN ORDINANCE OF THE MAYOR AND VILLAGE COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE OF PALMETTO BAY, FLORIDA, RELATING TO THE VILLAGE'S CODE OF ORDINANCES, AMENDING DIVISION 30-130, ENTITLED "ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES" AMENDING DISTANCE SEPARATION EXEMPTIONS FOR SPECIFIED USES; PROVIDING FOR SUNDAY PACKAGE SALES; PROVIDING FOR ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT, CODIFICATION, SEVERABILITY AND AN EFFECTIVE DATE.
  - B. AN ORDINANCE OF THE MAYOR AND VILLAGE COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE OF PALMETTO BAY, FLORIDA, RELATING TO THE VILLAGE'S CODE OF ORDINANCES, AMENDING DIVISION 30-90, ENTITLED "SIGN REGULATIONS"; REGULATING TEMPORARY SIGNS UNIFORMLY AS TO SIZE, AND DURATION, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO POLITICAL SIGNS AND PERSONAL EXPRESSION SIGNS; AND PROVIDING FOR A MINIMUM 90 DAY PERIOD FOR DISPLAY OF SAID SIGNS; PROVIDING FOR ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT, CODIFICATION, SEVERABILITY AND AN EFFECTIVE DATE. [Sponsored by Mayor Shelley Stanczyk and Council Person Tendrich].

Village of Palmetto Bay

Agenda for Local Planning Agency Special Meeting of February 6, 2012

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### **3. NEXT MEETING AND ADJOURNMENT**

PURSUANT TO FLORIDA STATUTES 286.0105, THE VILLAGE HEREBY ADVISES THE PUBLIC THAT IF A PERSON DECIDES TO APPEAL ANY DECISION MADE BY THIS COUNCIL WITH RESPECT TO ANY MATTER CONSIDERED AT ITS MEETING OR HEARING, HE OR SHE WILL NEED A RECORD OF THE PROCEEDINGS, AND THAT FOR SUCH PURPOSE, THE AFFECTED PERSON MAY NEED TO ENSURE THAT A VERBATIM RECORD OF THE PROCEEDING IS MADE, WHICH RECORD INCLUDES THE TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE APPEAL IS TO BE BASED. THIS NOTICE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CONSENT BY THE VILLAGE FOR THE INTRODUCTION OR ADMISSION OF OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE OR IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE, NOR DOES IT AUTHORIZE CHALLENGES OR APPEALS NOT OTHERWISE ALLOWED BY LAW.



To: Honorable Mayor and Village Council

Date: February 6, 2012

From: Ron E. Williams, Village Manager

RE: Alcoholic Beverages Ordinance  
-2<sup>nd</sup> Reading and LPA Hearing

**AN ORDINANCE OF THE MAYOR AND VILLAGE COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE OF PALMETTO BAY, FLORIDA, RELATING TO THE VILLAGE'S CODE OF ORDINANCES, AMENDING DIVISION 30-130, ENTITLED "ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES" AMENDING DISTANCE SEPARATION EXEMPTIONS FOR SPECIFIED USES; PROVIDING FOR SUNDAY PACKAGE SALES; PROVIDING FOR ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT, CODIFICATION, SEVERABILITY AND AN EFFECTIVE DATE.**

**BACKGROUND:**

In July of 2007, the Village enacted its Alcoholic Beverages ordinance under Division 30-130, which provided for distance separations and hours and days of sales for businesses that sell alcoholic beverages. The ordinance identified specific zoning districts within the regulations as it pertained to various types of establishments engaged in such activities. This action was unnecessary as Section 30-50 already provides permitted use lists within in each of the Village's zoning districts. Adversely, by adding the zoning designation information to the Alcohol Beverages Ordinance, the regulations had an unintended effect of excluding those zoning designations within the FT&I District which permit establishments that sell such stock from the "establishment" specific criteria. The proposed ordinance seeks to correct this by developing uniform regulations based upon the "alcoholic beverage establishment" designation, while continuing to rely upon Section 30-50 to identify where in the Village such uses are generally permitted. The proposed ordinance also provides for alcohol sales at package stores (sale for off premise consumption only) on Sundays consistent with the hours of operations permitted during the remainder of the week.

**ANALYSIS:**

The proposed ordinance was reviewed for consistency with the criteria established in Section 30-30.7(b). The following is a review of those criteria:

**Criteria (1):** Whether the proposal is consistent with the comprehensive plan, including the adopted infrastructure minimum levels of service standards and the Village's concurrency Management Program.

**Analysis:** The Comprehensive Plan and the Village's concurrency management plan does not address the regulations of alcoholic beverages.

**Finding:** Not applicable

**Criteria (2):** Whether the proposal is in conformance with all applicable requirements of Chapter 30.

**Analysis:** The proposed amendment simplifies the Chapter 30 and none of the proposed changes violate Chapter 30.

**Findings:** Consistent

**Criteria (3)** Whether, and the extent to which, land use and development conditions have changed since the effective date of the existing regulations, and whether the changes support or work against the proposed change in land use policy.

**Analysis:** The existing alcohol ordinance identifies specific zoning districts together with use specific requirements such as distance separations. This action is unnecessary as Section 30-50 already provides permitted use lists within in each of the Village's zoning districts. Adversely, by maintaining the zoning designation information within the Alcohol Beverages Ordinance, the regulations had the unintended effect of excluding those zoning designations within the FT&I District which permit establishments that sell such stock from the "establishment" specific criteria. The proposed ordinance seeks to correct this by developing uniform regulations based upon the "alcoholic beverage establishment" designation, while continuing to rely upon Section 30-50 to identify where in the Village such uses are generally permitted.

**Findings:** Consistent

**Criteria (4)** Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal would result in any incompatible land uses, considering the type and locations of uses involved, the impact on the adjacent or neighboring properties, consistency with existing development, as well as compatibility with existing and proposed land uses.

**Analysis:** The proposed ordinance does not change the list of permitted uses within the Village's zoning districts.

**Finding:** Consistent

**Criteria (5)** Whether, and the extent to which, the proposal would result in demands on transportation systems, public facilities and service; would exceed the capacity of the facilities and services, existing or programmed, including: transportation, water and

wastewater services, solid waste disposal, drainage, recreation, education, emergency services, and similar necessary facilities and services.

**Analysis:** The proposed ordinance does not change the list of permitted uses within the Village's zoning districts thus it does not affect the capacity of existing facilities or services as described above.

**Finding:** Consistent

**Criteria (6)** Whether, and to the extent to which, the proposal would result in adverse impacts on the natural environment, including consideration of wetland protection, preservation of groundwater aquifer wildlife habitats, and vegetative communities.

**Analysis:** The proposed ordinance does not change the list of permitted uses within the Village's zoning districts thus it does not affect the natural environment as described above.

**Finding:** Consistent

**Criteria (7)** Whether, and to the extent to which, the proposal would adversely affect the property values in the affected area, or adversely affect the general welfare.

**Analysis:** The proposed ordinance does not change the list of permitted uses within the Village's zoning districts thus it does not increase the adverse effect on the general welfare.

**Findings:** Consistent

**Criteria (8)** Whether the proposal would result in an orderly and compatible land use pattern, Any positive and negative effects on land use patter shall be identified.

**Analysis:** The proposed ordinance does not change the list of permitted uses within the Village's zoning districts thus it does not increase the positive or negative effects on the land use pattern.

**Findings:** Consistent

**Criteria (9)** Whether the proposal would in conflict with the public interest, and whether it is in harmony with the purpose of Chapter 30.

Honorable Mayor and Village Council  
Alcoholic Beverages Ordinance  
February 6, 2012  
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Analysis        The proposed ordinance does not change the list of permitted uses within the Village's zoning districts. The proposed amendment simplifies the Chapter 30 and none of the proposed changes violate Chapter 30.

Findings:      Consistent

**Criteria (10)** Other matters which the local planning agency or Village Council in its legislative discretion may deem appropriate.

Finding:        As determined by the Village Council.

**FISCAL/BUDGETARY IMPACT:**

There are no fiscal impacts in implementing this Ordinance.

**RECOMMENDATION:**

Approval



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DIVISION 30-130

ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES

\* \* \*

**30-130.2 EXCEPTIONS TO SPACING AND DISTANCE REQUIREMENTS.**

The restrictions and spacing requirements set forth in subsection 30-130.1 above shall not apply to:

\* \* \*

(b) ~~Restaurants in B-1, and B-2 districts. Dining rooms or restaurants located in B-1 and B-2 districts which comply with the requirements of such districts and~~ which serve cooked, full course meals, daily prepared on the premises, or such other dining rooms or restaurants in other more liberal districts complying with the requirements ~~of B-1 and B-2 districts~~ therein and which serve cooked, full course meals, daily prepared on the premises, providing that only a service bar is used and the sale of alcoholic beverages are sold only to persons seated at tables. Sidewalk cafes in conjunction with a bonafied restaurant are exempt.

(c) Cocktail lounge-bars in restaurants. Cocktail lounge-bars as an accessory use in ~~restaurants located in B-1 and B-2 districts~~, provided the restaurant occupies no less than 4,000 square feet of gross floor space, and has accommodations for service of 200 or more patrons at tables, and provided that the restaurant prepares and serves fully cooked meals daily and contains full kitchen facilities, meaning commercial grade burners, ovens, range hood(s) and refrigeration units of such size and quantity to accommodate the occupancy content of the restaurant, and provided that the restaurant shall be prohibited from advertising itself as a bar, cocktail lounge-bar, saloon, nightclub or similar type of establishment; and further provided that once the restaurant use is terminated, the cocktail lounge use will automatically terminate. The cocktail lounge-bar in the restaurant structure shall not have separate outside patron entrances, provided, however, a fire door exit shall be permitted, when the same is equipped with panic-type hardware and locks and is maintained in a locked position except in emergencies; and provided the cocktail lounge-bar shall be so located that there is no indication from the outside of the structure that the cocktail lounge/bar is within the structure, and provided that the accessory cocktail lounge-bar is no larger than fifteen percent (15%) of the gross square footage of the restaurant, and provided that the alcoholic beverages are served for on-premises consumption only; and further provided that the operating hours for the cocktail lounge-bar shall not extend beyond the permitted hours of operation for the restaurant.

(d) Beer and wine for off-premises consumption. The sale of beer and wine as a grocery item for consumption off the premises, from grocery stores, convenience stores within the hours adopted and prescribed by the Village Council.

(e) ~~Night clubs in B-2 districts.~~ Night clubs where the same are located in a hotel or apartment hotel and under the same roof, which contains at least 200 guest rooms or apartment units under the same roof, provided the exterior of any such building shall not have store fronts or give the appearance of commercial or mercantile activity as viewed from the highways.

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2 (f) Package stores in shopping centers ~~in B-1 and B-2 districts~~. Package stores in  
3 shopping centers ~~in B-1 and B-2 districts~~ under one (1) ownership with an improved building area of  
4 not less than 40,000 square feet of floor area thereon, and with an improved and developed parking  
5 area of not less than 200 vehicles. Only one (1) such package store will be permitted in the shopping  
6 center. ~~Said~~ The package store shall be at least 1,500 feet from any other licensed alcoholic beverage  
7 establishment and 2,500 feet from a religious facility or public school measured as otherwise  
8 provided in this ~~d~~Division.  
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10 (f)(g) Compliance with section 30-60.17, the Village's Sidewalk Cafe Ordinance.  
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14 Sec. 30-130.6. - Hours and days of sale.

15 No alcoholic beverages shall be sold or served within Village limits except at such hours and on such  
16 days and by such vendors as set forth below:  
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18 (a) *Establishments for package sales only.* Vendors holding a state beverage license for the sale of  
19 alcoholic beverages for consumption off the premises only, ~~shall make no sale of alcoholic beverages~~  
20 ~~on Sundays, and shall make no sale of alcoholic beverages during any day weekdays~~ except between  
21 the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. No variance of this provision shall be allowed.  
22

23 (b) *Establishments for the sale of products other than alcoholic beverages.* Vendors holding a state beverage  
24 license for the sale of alcoholic beverages may make sales of beer and wine in sealed containers for  
25 consumption off the premises during such hours as their stores legally remain open for the sale of  
26 other goods or during weekdays and Sunday except between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.  
27 which ever is less; provided further, however, that nothing in the foregoing proviso shall be deemed  
28 to modify any of the provisions of the zoning regulations as heretofore or hereafter adopted.  
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30 (c) *Private clubs.* Vendors holding a state beverage license for the sale of alcoholic beverages for  
31 consumption on the premises in private clubs shall make no sale of such alcoholic beverages except  
32 between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. of the following day, and shall make no sale of beer on  
33 Sundays except between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. on the following Monday; and shall  
34 make no sale of any other alcoholic beverages on Sundays, except between the hours of 5:00 p.m.  
35 and 1:00 a.m. on the following Monday.  
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37 (d) *Hotels and apartment hotels.* Vendors holding a state beverage license from the for the sale of  
38 alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises in hotels and motels which are restricted by  
39 the zoning regulations to making such sales to guests only, shall make no sales of such alcoholic  
40 beverages except between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. on the following day on weekdays,  
41 and shall make no sale of beer on Sundays, except between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. on  
42 the following Monday; and shall make no sale of any other alcoholic beverages on Sundays except  
43 between the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. on the following Monday. In hotels and motels where  
44 package sales are restricted to guests only under the zoning regulations, no such sales shall be made

1 except between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on weekdays, in hotels and motels located in a  
2 proper business zone and conforming to the zoning regulations permitting unrestricted sales of  
3 alcoholic beverages. "Premises", as used in this section, shall be confined to the bar and/or cocktail  
4 lounge located in the particular hotel or motel.

5 |  
6 (e) *Restaurants.* Vendors holding a state beverage license for the sale of alcoholic beverages for  
7 consumption on the premises in restaurants, which are restricted by the zoning regulations to  
8 making such sales with the service of food only, shall make no sales of such alcoholic beverages on  
9 weekdays except between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. on the following day, and shall make  
10 no sales of beer and wine on Sundays except between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. on the  
11 following Monday; and shall make no sales of other alcoholic beverages on Sundays except between  
12 the hours of 1:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. on the following Monday. Sales of alcoholic beverages for  
13 consumption off the premises shall not be permitted.

14 (f) *Bars and cocktail lounges.* Vendors holding a state beverage license for the sale of alcoholic  
15 beverages for consumption on the premises in those bars and cocktail lounges that are not restricted  
16 by the zoning regulations to guests only, or to service with food, or the like, shall make no sales of  
17 such alcoholic beverages on weekdays except between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. of the  
18 following day; and shall make no sales of beer and wine on Sundays except between the hours of  
19 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. of the following Monday; and shall make no sales of any other alcoholic  
20 beverages on Sunday except between the hours of 5:00 p.m. and 1:00 a.m. of the following Monday;  
21 sales of beer and wine for consumption off the premises shall not be made on weekdays except  
22 between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. of the following day; and shall not be made on  
23 Sundays except between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. of the following Monday. Sale of  
24 other alcoholic beverages for consumption off the premises shall not be made on weekdays except  
25 between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m.; and shall not be made on Sundays.

26 (g) *Night clubs.* For the purpose of this Division, the term "night club" is defined as any place of  
27 business located within any building or establishment under one roof and on one floor, wherein  
28 entertainment or music or both are regularly supplied, and providing meals and refreshments  
29 prepared on the premises, and having a seating capacity of not less than 40 people at tables; having  
30 an aggregate floor space of not less 2,200 square feet; and providing a dance floor containing not  
31 less than 308 square feet, such floor space provided for dancing to be free from chairs, tables or  
32 other obstructions at all times. Any night club which holds a night club license from the Village and  
33 which holds a State beverage license for the sale of alcoholic beverages on the premises, shall be  
34 permitted to remain open, and sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises from 8:00  
35 a.m. to 4:50 a.m. of the following day during week days, and on Sundays to remain open and sell  
36 beer for consumption on the premises from 10:00 a.m. to 4:50 a.m. of the following Monday; and to  
37 remain open and sell other alcoholic beverages on Sunday for the consumption on the premises  
38 from 5:00 p.m. to 4:50 a.m. of the following Monday; and except that where the alcoholic beverages  
39 are served with meals at tables, the same may be served from 1:00 p.m. on Sunday to 4:50 a.m. on  
40 the following Monday. It is specifically provided, however, that each and every night club that may  
41 operate in the Village in accordance with this section shall close its doors and have all its patrons off  
42 its premises by not later than 5:00 a.m. of each day.

43 (h) *Package sales on Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve and on Sundays during the month of December.* All  
44 vendors in the Village holding valid, current State beverage licenses for the sale of alcoholic  
45 beverages for consumption off the premises (establishments for package sales only) may make sales  
46 and keep their places of business open until 12:00 midnight on Christmas Eve (December 24th) and

1 New Year's Eve (December 31st), ~~and between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m. on Sundays~~  
2 ~~during the month of December.~~

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4 (i) *Adult entertainment club.* Adult entertainment club which has a certificate of use and which  
5 holds a State beverage license for the sale of alcoholic beverages on the premises, shall be permitted  
6 to remain open, and sell alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises from 8:00 a.m. to  
7 4:50 a.m. of the following day during week days, and on Sundays to remain open and sell beer for  
8 consumption on the premises from 10:00 a.m. to 4:50 a.m. of the following Monday; and to remain  
9 open and sell other alcoholic beverages on Sunday for the consumption on the premises from 5:00  
10 p.m. to 4:50 a.m. of the following Monday. It is specifically provided, however, that each and every  
11 adult entertainment club that may operate in the Village in accordance with this section shall close its  
12 doors and have all its patrons off its premises by not later than 5:00 a.m. of each day.

13 (j) *Additional interpretations.* Wherever in this section it is provided that weekday sales of  
14 alcoholic beverages are permitted between any certain hour and a stated time on the following  
15 day, the term "following day" shall be deemed to include Sunday.

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19 Section 2. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this  
20 ordinance are repealed.

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22 Section 3. This ordinance shall be codified and included in the Code of Ordinances.

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24 Section 4. If any section, clause, sentence, or phrase of this ordinance is for any reason  
25 held invalid or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, the holding shall not affect the  
26 validity of the remaining portions of this ordinance.

27  
28 Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect immediately.

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31 PASSED AND ENACTED this [ ] day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2011.

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34 Attest: \_\_\_\_\_  
35 Meighan Alexander Shelley Stanczyk  
36 Village Clerk Mayor

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38 APPROVED AS TO FORM:

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40 \_\_\_\_\_  
41 Eve A. Boutsis  
42 Village Attorney

1 FINAL VOTE AT ADOPTION:  
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3 | Council Member Patrick Fiore \_\_\_\_\_  
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5 Council Member Howard Tendrich \_\_\_\_\_  
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7 Council Member Joan Lindsay \_\_\_\_\_  
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9 Vice-Mayor Brian W. Pariser \_\_\_\_\_  
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11 Mayor Shelley Stanczyk \_\_\_\_\_  
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To: Mayor and Village Council

Date: February 6, 2011

From: Eve A. Boutsis, Village Attorney

Re: Sign ordinance revisions  
Second Reading

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**AN ORDINANCE OF THE MAYOR AND VILLAGE COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE OF PALMETTO BAY, FLORIDA, RELATING TO THE VILLAGE'S CODE OF ORDINANCES, AMENDING DIVISION 30-90, ENTITLED "SIGN REGULATIONS"; REGULATING TEMPORARY SIGNS UNIFORMLY AS TO SIZE, AND DURATION, INCLUDING POLITICAL SIGNS, AND PERSONAL EXPRESSION SIGNS; AND PROVIDING FOR CLARIFICATION AS TO CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF SIGNAGE CODE; PROVIDING FOR ORDINANCES IN CONFLICT, CODIFICATION, SEVERABILITY; AND AN EFFECTIVE DATE.**  
[Sponsored by Mayor Shelley Stanczyk].

**BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS:**

In recent months many residents and Council members have requested an amendment to Division 30-90 of the Village's Land Development Code which would limit the period of time political campaign signs can be installed on residential property and their corresponding sizes. Political speech is amongst the most protected form of speech recognized by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In regulating such speech, a municipality must be "content neutral" in its regulation of signage – in other words, similar types of noncommercial temporary signs must be treated uniformly, the content cannot be the basis of enforcement.

Many local communities have enacted regulations as to the size, type, length of duration for such signs, without adequately addressing the constitutional issue of "content neutrality" described above. For example, the City of Tampa provides a specific size limitation, and a 60 day posting window, with a seven day removal period after the election. Fort Pierce provides a size limitation, 30 day window, and a removal period of seven days after the election. The Miami-Dade County Code categorizes political signs as a special event, uniformly regulating the size (22 by 28 inches), and requiring removal within 30 days of the special event (election), but does not provide a time regulation prior to the event. The City of Miami Beach (Section 138-134) defines "Election Signs" as signs announcing political candidates seeking public office or advocating positions relating to ballot issues. That code limits such signs to one (1) per residential building or lot, with a sign area similar to that as provided for construction signs, and no limitation on the posting period prior to election, with removal required seven (7) days after the election to which they applied. City of Miami, 10.3.2.5, limits residential political signs to four (4) square feet in aggregate sign area their removal within thirty (30) days of the election, and provide no length of time the sign may be installed prior to an election. No political sign ordinance for Coral Gables was available at the time of this report, as their zoning code is at present being substantially modified. One of the deficiency

with the above examples is they all failed to apply a consistent standard for all non-commercial signage. Instead, they were either individually regulated or merely tied to a more narrowly defined sign type. Such action thus results in a content based regulation.

Federal Courts have ruled that 60 day time periods for a temporary sign are content based regulations and thus have overturned such code provisions. Time to remove is much less sensitive, as long as it is uniformly handled. It is safest not to have a time period, however, if one is desired, it should be at least 90 days and as indicated above, should apply to other temporary noncommercial signs.

In consideration of the above explanation and consistent with the direction provided at prior Committee of the Whole hearings, the attached proposed ordinance also seeks to modify the current code for temporary noncommercial signs by (1) increase the sign size from 22"x28" to 620 square inches, (2) provide for a 90 day posting prior to the election, and (3) provide a seven (7) day removal period at the conclusion of the election. Staff recommends modifying the code to delineate these specific types of signs and provide the same content neutral regulation to those signs, as other temporary noncommercial signs, such as political and personnel expression signs. [*Café Erotica of Florida, Inc. v. St. Johns County*, 360 F.3d 1274 (Fla. 11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2004)( 11<sup>th</sup> Circuit found a size limitation on political signs unconstitutional when same did not apply to other signs). Section 30-90.4 has been modified to include language relating to reasonable, time, place and manner restrictions as to these types of signs. This change addresses the Village's intent to comply with First Amendment application by the Courts.

**Please note**, between first and second reading staff met to discuss the proposed revision to 30-90. For the ordinance modification to be truly "content neutral" and avoid as many challenges as possible, staff recommends a further modification, at second reading, to **solely** provide a 90 period for posting of the temporary signs prior to an election, and not any reference to a qualifying period. The reason for the proposed modification is due to the fact that different elections have different qualifying periods, thus the Village would be looking at the "content" to determine whether there was a violation of the time restriction based upon the different qualifying dates. To clarify, judicial elections, county elections, village elections, and federal elections all have different qualifying periods or terms. To avoid discussion of "content", whether the sign is a federal, county, state, or other campaign sign, the Village is best protected from a challenge by simply having a uniform time period. This action may not preclude the Village's ordinance from a legal challenge to the 90 day period because federal and/or other election candidates have a longer campaign period. Such a candidate might an incentive to challenge the Village's ordinance, so as to be able to maintain the signs for a longer period than 90 days, but as the ordinance is tailored to be content neutral, our position in defending it is strengthened.

The following consists of research and analysis of the law as it pertains to political signs and free speech:

The Court in *Curry v. Prince George's County*, 33 F. Supp.2d 447, 452 (D. Md. 1999), undertook a detailed explanation of the First Amendment and case law applying to political speech and government regulation. Provided below is an excerpt from that opinion for your reference, with some edits to assist in the analysis and/or emphasis of certain provisions:

The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." U.S. Const., amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment applies this limitation to the states. *City of Ladue v. Gilleo*, 512 US 43 (1994). The Supreme Court has held that "the First Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political office." *EU v. San Francisco County Dem. Cent. Comm.*, 489 US 214, 223 (1989). Moreover, "communication by signs and posters is virtually pure speech." *Arlington County Rep. Comm.*, 983 F.2d at 593 (citing *Baldwin v. Redwood*, 540 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1976), cert. denied, sub nom., *Leipzig v. Baldwin*, 431 US 913 (1977)). This does not mean that all limitations on political speech are impermissible, including burdens with respect to political signs. Signs are subject to municipal regulation because, "unlike oral speech, signs take up space and may obstruct views, distract motorists, displace alternative uses for land, and pose other problems that legitimately call for regulation." *City of Ladue*, 512 US at 48.

The Supreme Court has recognized limitations on political signs in a variety of circumstances. In *Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent*, 466 US 789 (1984), for example, the Court upheld a ban on political signs on public property, specifically utility poles. In *Burson v. Freeman*, 504 US 191 (1992), the Court upheld a ban on temporary political signs within 100 feet of polling places. Courts have also routinely upheld regulation of signs by size and shape. Cf., e.g., *Outdoor Sys., Inc. v. City of Mesa*, 997 F.2d 604, 615 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993). Indeed, in the present case [In *Curry*] Plaintiffs raise no challenge to any portion of the County zoning ordinance that would affect the size, shape or location of campaign signs.

In analyzing whether a governmental burden upon political speech will be permitted, the conventional approach has been to begin by determining first whether the burden on the speech is content-based or content-neutral. If content-based, the Government is required to show a compelling interest before the burden will be sustained. A rule of strict scrutiny applies. See *Burson*, 504 US at 197-198. "With rare exceptions, content discrimination in regulations of the speech of private citizens on private property or in a traditional public forum is presumptively impermissible, and this presumption is a very strong one." *City of Ladue*, 521 US 43, at 59 (O'Connor, J. concurring). Even where the government has declared a policy of promoting aesthetics and traffic safety, both recognized as "substantial governmental goals," see *Arlington County Rep. Comm.* 983 F.2d at 594, restrictions intended to accomplish those interests have failed to pass strict scrutiny and have been struck down. See,

e.g., *City of Ladue*, 512 US 43; *Rappa v. New Castle County*, 18 F.3d 1043 (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 1994); *Arlington County Rep. Comm.* 983 F.2d at 593.

If, on the other hand, the burden on the speech is deemed content-neutral, a less strict standard of scrutiny applies. The government need only show that it has a significant interest at stake, that its regulation is narrowly tailored to promote that interest, and that ample alternative means are available that would permit the desired communication. *Burson*, 504 US at 197; *Arlington County Rep. Comm.* 983 F.2d at 593.

Until *City of Ladue*, virtually all courts that considered the constitutionality of pre-election durational limitation on political campaign signs engaged in the conventional analysis and found the limitations to be content-based. [Emphasis Added]. See, e.g., *Whitton*, 54 F.3d at 1404 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995) (city ordinance found to be content-based where “the words on a sign define whether it is subject to durational limitations”); *Dimas v. City of Warren*, 939 F. Supp. 554, 556-57 (ED Mo. 1996) (ordinance permitting temporary election signs for only 45 days prior to election “is not content-neutral”); *Orazio v. Town of North Hempstead*, 426 F.Supp. 1144, 1149 (E.D. NY 1977) (ordinance containing “pre-election time limit ... discriminates against political wall signs solely on the basis of their content”); see also *City of Antioch v. Candidates’ Outdoor Graphic Serv.*, 557 F.Supp. 52, 58 (ordinance limiting posting of outdoor political signs to 60 days prior to election was viewpoint neutral, but “by singling out political signs for restrictive treatment . . . (the) ordinance clearly conflicts with ... *Metromedia, [Inc. v. San Diego]*, 453 US 490 (1981)”; *Collier v. City of Tacoma*, 854 P.2d 1046, 1053 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (ordinances limiting posting of political signs to 60 days prior to election “fall within the realm of content-based restrictions”). Again, while recognizing aesthetics and traffic safety to be “significant government interests,” none of these courts found those interests sufficiently compelling to pass the applicable strict scrutiny test. See, e.g., *McCormack v. Township of Clinton*, 872 F.Supp. 1320, 1325, n. 2 (“No court has ever held that [interests in aesthetics and traffic safety] form a compelling justification for a content-based restriction of political speech”); *Whitton v. City of Gladstone*, 832 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (W.D. Mo. 1993) (“traffic safety and aesthetics are significant interests ... but they are not compelling interests, especially given the nature of the First Amendment rights at stake”). Accordingly, these courts held durational restrictions on political signs to be unconstitutional.

In *City of Ladue*, the Supreme Court took a different tack. 512 US 43. The Court was faced with a city ordinance that effectively banned any “cause” signs displayed from a private residence. *Id.* at 45. Among several exemptions from the prohibition were “for sale” signs. *Id.* Gilleo had been deemed in violation of the ordinance because she posted a sign in her window saying “For Peace in the Gulf.” *Id.* But instead of pursuing the “normal inquiry . . . first, to determine whether a regulation is content-

based or content-neutral, and then, based on the answer to that question, to apply the proper level of scrutiny,” *Id.* at 59. (O’Connor, J., concurring), the Court assumed *arguendo* that the ordinance was “free of impermissible content or viewpoint discrimination,” *Id.* at 53, and promptly proceeded to acknowledge the city’s “interest in minimizing the visual clutter associated with signs,” *Id.* at 54. The Court then launched into a broadscale encomium with respect to signs displayed on private residences, which it termed “a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important.” *Id.*

The Court’s comments bear quoting in xtensor because of their relevance to the disposition of the present case: Signs that react to a local happening or express a view on a controversial issue both reflect and animate change in the life of a community. Often placed on lawns or in windows, residential signs play an important part in political campaigns, during which they are displayed to signal the resident’s support for particular candidates, parties or causes. . . . They may not afford the same opportunities for conveying complex ideas as do other media, but residential signs have long been an important and distinct medium of expression.

\* \* \*

Displaying a sign from one’s own residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means. Precisely because of their location, such signs provide information about the identity of the “speaker.” As an early and eminent student of rhetoric observed, the identity of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to persuade. . . . A sign advocating “Peace in the Gulf” in the front lawn of a retired general or decorated war veteran may provoke a different reaction than the same sign in a 10-year-old child’s bedroom window or the same message on a bumper sticker of a passing automobile. An espousal of socialism may carry different implications when displayed on the grounds of a stately mansion than when pasted on a factory wall or an ambulatory sandwich board.

Residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobility, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute . . . Even for the affluent, the added costs in money or time of taking out a newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street, or standing in front of one’s house with a handheld sign may make the difference between participating and not participating in some public debate . . . .

Furthermore, a person who puts up a sign at her residence often intends to reach neighbors, an audience that could not be reached nearly as well by other means (Emphasis in original).

\* \* \*

A special respect for individual liberty in the home has long been a part of our culture and our law ...; that principle has special resonance when the government seeks to constrain a person's ability to speak there ... (Emphasis in original). Most Americans would be understandably dismayed, given that tradition, to learn that it was illegal to display from their window an 8- by 11-inch sign expressing their political views. Whereas the government's need to mediate among various competing uses, including expressive ones, for public streets and facilities is constant and unavoidable .... Its need to regulate temperate speech from the home is surely much less pressing ... “ (citations and footnotes omitted), 512 U.S. at 54-58.

The Court thus assumed the content-neutrality of the ban, acknowledged the City's interest in clutter – which is to say aesthetics and traffic safety – but, given the special nature of “cause” speech emanating from private residential property, found that ample alternative means for communicating the message did not exist and struck the ordinance down. *City of Ladue*, 512 US at 58.

The City of Ladue's ordinance, to be sure, established a nearly total ban on residential signs. But the language of the Court's opinion leaves little room to argue that an extended durational ban on such signs, whether the message supports a cause or a political candidate, is any more acceptable. In the first place, there is no natural terminal date for a “cause” sign; a cause and a private resident's passion for it exists as long as the cause exists. Yet the Court in *Ladue* speaks interchangeably of “cause” and “political” signs. *See* 512 U.S. at 55. Moreover, a number of problems arise in attempting to make any distinction between the two. To recur to Plaintiffs' arguments on the void-for-vagueness issue:

When does a “cause” sign cease being a “cause” sign and become a political one? If a “cause” sign is linked to a political candidate or a ballot question and the candidate or ballot fails, what happens if the private resident wishes to continue promoting the cause after the election? Ultimately, why is the expression of personal support for a viable reform candidate capable of bringing immediate changes to government any less deserving of support than the expression of an opinion in support of a cause that is fringe in nature and which has little or no hope of ever becoming a reality?

In this Court's view, such questions effectively answer themselves. There is no distinction to be made between the political campaign signs in the present case and the “cause” sign in *City of Ladue*. When political campaign signs are posted on private residences, they merit the same special solicitude and protection established for cause signs in *City of Ladue*.

*City of Ladue* does state that the Court's decision that the city's “ban on almost all

residential signs violates the First Amendment by no means leaves the City powerless to address the ills that may be associated with residential signs.” 512 U.S. at 58. In a footnote the Court suggests that signs, “whether political or otherwise,” displayed by residents for a fee or offsite commercial advertisements on residential property might be regulated. *Id.* at n. 17. The Court also observes that it was “not confronted [in the case] with mere regulations short of a ban,” *Id.*, and that it was “confident that more temperate measures could in large part satisfy Ladue’s stated regulatory needs without harm to the First Amendment rights of its citizens.” 512 U.S. at 58-59.

But the Court’s principal argument with regard to limitations upon excessive sign use is that private residents will tend to impose their own limitations: It bears mentioning that individual residents themselves have strong incentives to keep their own property values up and to prevent “visual clutter” in their own yards and neighborhoods – incentives markedly different from those of persons who erect signs on others’ land, in others’ neighborhoods, or on public property. Residents’ self-interest diminishes the danger of the “unlimited” proliferation of residential signs that concerns the *City of Ladue*. 512 U.S. at 58.

Given this rationale as well as the overall thrust of *City of Ladue*, this Court concludes that the most reasonable construction to put upon the Supreme Court’s reference to “mere regulations short of a ban” is that while they may include size, shape and location restrictions upon campaign signs, they may *not* include durational ones. [Emphasis Added]. Extended durational bans on political speech for all but 45 days before and 10 days after a political election, are bans nonetheless – inconsistent with the “venerable” status that the Supreme Court has accorded to individual speech emanating from an individual’s private residence.

\* \* \*

To survive constitutional scrutiny, the duration a sign that can be posted should be tied to the durability of the material the sign is made from, not the content of the sign. A municipality should not regulate political signs separately from other temporary or non-commercial signage. Rather, such signs should be lumped together. Temporary and non-commercial signage can be provided a deadline on removal of the sign after the end of the “event” that triggers it. Regulation of political advertising, like all temporary advertising, must be “non-discriminatory.” It is “noncommercial speech” that is highly scrutinized by the Courts. Campaign signs are a type of temporary sign, and their size, number, location, requirements for removal, and other aspects must be regulated uniformly with other speech. Though the safest course is to avoid duration limits for political signs, the issue is often a concern for local government, as it is the case for the Village of Palmetto Bay. The US Supreme Court, in 1994, in *City of Ladue v. Gilleo*, 512 US 43, ruled that a local ordinance precluding certain signs, and regulating the time for installing the “Peace in Gulf” sign was discriminatory. The concept was that some prohibitions foreclosing entire media of expression may suppress too much speech, in violation of the free speech clause of the Federal

Constitution's First Amendment, even if such prohibitions are completely free of content discrimination or viewpoint discrimination. The Courts have indicated that municipal ordinances regulating the display of signs are properly subject to attack as violating the free speech clause on the ground that such ordinances prohibit too much protected speech. A city ordinance prohibiting homeowners from displaying any signs on their property except residence identification signs, and signs warning of safety hazards, violates the rights of city residents under the free speech clause of the Federal Constitution's First Amendment, because (1) although the ordinance is supported by the city's valid interest in minimizing visual clutter, this interest is not compelling; (2) the city has almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of communication that is both unique and important, even if it is possible that flags, which are not restricted by the ordinance, could be used in an unconventional manner to carry the same messages; (3) adequate substitutes do not exist for the medium of speech that the city has closed off, and thus the ordinance is not a valid regulation of the time, place, or manner of speech even if city residents remain free to convey their desired messages by other means--as (a) displaying a sign from one's own residence often carries a message quite distinct from placing the same sign someplace else, or conveying the same text or picture by other means, (b) residential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of communication, and (c) the audience of neighbors intended to be reached by a residential sign cannot be reached nearly as well by other means; and (4) the government's need to regulate temperate speech from the home is much less pressing than the government's need to mediate among various competing expressive uses for public streets and facilities. See *City of Ladue v. Gilleo* (US Supreme Court 1994, Unanimous decision). A Federal Court in Maryland, in 1999 invalidated a sign ordinance that limited the posting of political campaign signs in private residences to 45 days before and up to 10 days after an election. (This is the *Curry* case quoted at length above). The Court indicated "there is no distinction to be made between the political campaign signs in the present case and the "cause" sign in *City of Ladue*. . . . When political campaign signs are posted on private residences, they merit the same special solicitude and protection established for cause signs in *City of Ladue*." *Curry v. Prince George's County*, 33 F. Supp.2d 447, 452 (D. Md. 1999).

In *Arlington County Republican Committee v. Arlington County*, 983 F.2d 587 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1993) the Court invalidated a county law that imposed a two-sign limit on temporary signs for each residence. The court noted that "the two-sign limit infringes on this speech by preventing homeowners from expressing support for more than two candidates when there are numerous contested elections." The Supreme Court of Ohio, in *City of Painesville Building Department v. Dworken & Bernstein Co.*, 733 NE 2d 1152(Oh. 2000) ruled that a city law requiring the removal of political signs within 48 hours after an election is unconstitutional as applied to the posting of such signs on private property. "Although the Supreme Court has not considered the issue, the overwhelming majority of courts that have reviewed sign ordinances imposing durational limits for temporary political signs tied to a specific election date have found them to be unconstitutional."

In short, political signs cannot be prohibited (except on governmental property - case law supports this proposition - *Members of City Council v. Taxpayer Vincent*, 466 US 789, 801 (1984). This does not mean that local government may never legislate in the area of political signs. A local government

may regulate the size, shape and location of these signs. Such regulations are ordinarily considered content-neutral and reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions on speech (federal review standard of First Amendment regulation of speech). There may also be allowed a cap on the number of signs – perhaps a 10-sign limit, per residence on yard signs. At some point, the sheer number of signs might realistically impair the aesthetics of a neighborhood. As to residential signs – the type, size, number, location must be uniform as to all types of temporary noncommercial signs. Currently there is no maximum number provided. A time period on signs prior to election is challenged as a prior constraint on speech. [Please note that homeowner's associations, as private parties, do not qualify as "state actors" and have more ability to regulate political signage under the association's declaration of rules, and by prohibiting the posting of signs at individual units. *Midlake on Big Boulder Lake, Condominium Assoc. v. Cappuccio*, 673 A.2d 340, 342 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1996) [Caveat: Florida Legislature in 1989, passed legislation that prevents associations from barring the display of American Flags. 718.113, Fla. Stat. It also allows the display of military flags and limits the size to 4.5 by 6 feet].

Municipal lawyers have prepared a checklist that they use when considering modifying or drafting an ordinance regulating signs:

- 1) Is the regulation content based?
- 2) If yes, strict scrutiny or exacting scrutiny is required to ascertain whether a limitation is justified by a compelling or overriding interest; whether the restriction is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest, and whether the Regulation does not limit more speech than is necessary to vindicate the public interest asserted by the government.
- 3) Is the regulation content neutral?
- 4) If yes, intermediate scrutiny is sufficient. The regulation must further an important or substantial government interest; the interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and the incidental restriction on alleged 1st Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. The regulation must still be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest; and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. It must focus on the source of the evils the government seeks to eliminate; and the elimination of the signage without banning or significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that does not create the same evils.

Please note that federal, state, and/or local campaign signs must be treated equally – there should be no distinguishing regulations between the types of election sign as that would be a content based regulation. Regulation of political signs would require strict scrutiny review by the Court system due to the First Amendment "free speech" protections of the US Bill of Rights. Any time period regulation, prior to an election, would require uniform application to all, or a majority of temporary signs within the community to qualify for "content neutral action." "With rare exceptions," regulations which discriminate based upon the content of speech of private citizens -- whether on private property or in a traditional public forum -- are "presumptively impermissible, and this presumption is a very strong one." *Curry v. Prince George County*, 33 F. Supp.2d 447, 552 (D.Md.

1999). In *Cleveland Board of Realtors v. City of Euclid*, 88 F.3d 382 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996), the Court found that a complete ban on yard signs unconstitutional because the court agreed that city ordinances regulating the size, number, and placement of signs in residential neighborhoods were unconstitutional restrictions on speech.

Pursuant to 30-30.7(b), staff, the Village Council, as the local planning agency, evaluating proposed amendments, the Village Council shall consider the following criteria: (1) whether the text change is consistent with the comprehensive; (2) whether the text change is in conformance with all applicable requirements of Chapter 30; (3) whether the land use and development conditions have changed since the effective date of the existing regulations in the community, and the changes support or work against the proposed change in land use policy; (4) whether the extent to which, the proposal would result in any incompatible land uses, considering the type and location of uses involved, the impact on adjacent or neighboring properties, consistency with existing development, as well as compatibility with existing and proposed land uses; (5) the extent to which, the proposal would result in demands on transportation systems, public facilities and services; would exceed the capacity of the facilities and services, existing or programmed, including: transportation, water and wastewater services, solid waste disposal, drainage, recreation, education, emergency services, and similar necessary facilities and services. (6) the extent to which, the proposal would result in adverse impacts on the natural environment, including consideration of wetland protection, preservation of groundwater aquifer, wildlife habitats, and vegetative communities. (7) the extent to which, the proposal would adversely affect the property values in the affected area, or adversely affect the general welfare; (8) whether the proposal would result in an orderly and compatible land use pattern. Any positive and negative effects on land use pattern shall be identified; (9) whether the proposal would be in conflict with the public interest, and whether it is in harmony with the purpose and intent of Chapter 30; and (10) any other matters which the local planning agency or the Village Council in its legislative discretion may deem appropriate. Given the analysis presented in this report, the proposed ordinance complies with above criteria or imposes no impacts thereto due to the proposed change in the signage code.

**FISCAL/BUDGETARY IMPACT:** There could be challenges to the temporary signage code based upon first amendment considerations. The Village has attempted to uniformly regulate temporary noncommercial signs in residential districts as to time, place and manner regardless of content. The Village's temporary signage code would be challenged upon a strict judicial scrutiny standard.

**RECOMMENDATION:** Decision of the Village Council.



1 512 US 43 (1994) as it relates to political signs and uniform time, manner, place restrictions and  
2 content neutrality; and,  
3

4 WHEREAS, the Village Council desires to limit personal expression and political signs,  
5 uniformly as to size and duration of 90 days (or qualifying for office, which ever date is longer); and,  
6

7 WHEREAS, the Mayor and Village Council desire to amend specific items in Division 30-  
8 90, entitled "Sign Regulations".  
9

10 BE IT ENACTED BY THE MAYOR AND VILLAGE COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE  
11 OF PALMETTO BAY, FLORIDA, AS FOLLOWS:  
12

13 Section 1. The Village of Palmetto Bay hereby amends Division 90 of Chapter 30,  
14 entitled "Sign Regulations" which shall read as follows:  
15

16 \* \* \*

17  
18 **DIVISION 30-90**

19  
20 **SIGN REGULATIONS**

21  
22 **SEC. 30-90.4. PURPOSE AND INTENT.**  
23

24 (a) The Village Council recognizes that there are various persons and entities that have an interest  
25 in communicating with the public through the use of signs that serve to identify businesses and  
26 services, residences and neighborhoods, and also to provide for expression of opinions. The council  
27 is also responsible for furthering the Village's obligation to its residents and visitors to maintain a  
28 safe and aesthetically pleasing environment where signs do not create excessive visual clutter and  
29 distraction or hazards for pedestrians and vehicles; where signs do not adversely impact the  
30 predominantly residential character of the Village and where signs do not conflict with the natural  
31 and scenic qualities of the Village. These regulations are intended to ensure that permitted signs will  
32 not, because of size, location, method of construction, installation or manner of display endanger  
33 the public safety, create distractions that may jeopardize pedestrian or vehicular traffic safety;  
34 mislead, confuse or obstruct the vision of people seeking to locate or identify uses or premises; or  
35 destroy or impair visual qualities of the Village which is essential to general welfare and economic  
36 viability.  
37

38 It is the intent of the council that the regulations contained in this Division shall provide uniform  
39 sign criteria, which regulate the size, height, graphic character, lighting, number and placement of  
40 signs in a manner that is compatible to the scale and character of the Village, and which shall place  
41 the fewest possible restrictions on personal liberties, property rights, free commerce, and the free  
42 exercise of Constitutional rights, while achieving the Village's goal of creating a safe, healthy,  
43 attractive and aesthetically pleasing environment that does not contain excessive clutter or visual  
44 distraction from right-of-ways and adjacent properties; the surrounding natural coastal environment  
45 and residential neighborhoods, and to ensure consistency with the Village's comprehensive plan.

1  
2 (b) *Scope.* The provisions of this Division shall govern the number, size, location, and character of  
3 all signs which may be permitted. No sign shall be permitted on a plot or parcel except in  
4 accordance with the provisions of this Division.  
5

6 (c) *Substitution of noncommercial speech for commercial speech.* Notwithstanding any provisions of this  
7 Division to the contrary, to the extent that this article permits a sign containing commercial copy, it  
8 shall permit a noncommercial sign to the same extent. The noncommercial message may occupy the  
9 entire sign area or any portion thereof, and may substitute for or be combined with the commercial  
10 message. The sign message may be changed from commercial to noncommercial messages, or from  
11 one noncommercial message to another, as frequently as desired by the sign's owner, provided that  
12 the sign is not prohibited, and the sign continues to comply with all requirements of this Division.  
13

14 (d) The Village may regulate the size, shape and location of temporary signs as content-neutral and  
15 reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions on speech (federal review standard of First  
16 Amendment regulation of speech). At some point, the sheer number of signs do realistically impair  
17 the aesthetics of a neighborhood and provided the temporary residential signs are regulated  
18 uniformly as to the type, size, number, and location the local regulation would comply with strict  
19 scrutiny review of the Courts. Temporary and non-commercial signage can be provided a deadline  
20 on removal of the sign after the end of the "event" that triggers it; and, the Village recognizes that  
21 regulation of speech, must be treated in a "non-discriminatory," manner as other "noncommercial  
22 speech" that is highly scrutinized by the Courts. Moreover, the Village recognizes that campaign  
23 signs are a type of temporary sign, and their size, number, location, requirements for removal, and  
24 other aspects must be regulated uniformly with other speech, and it is the Village's intent is to  
25 comply with Federal and State precedent, and comply with the unanimous decision of the US  
26 Supreme Court in 1994, in the matter *City of Ladue v. Gilleo*, 512 US 43 (1994) as it relates to political  
27 signs and uniform time, manner, place restrictions and content neutrality.  
28

29 (e) *Severability.*  
30

31 (1) *Generally.* If any part section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, phrase, clause,  
32 term or word of this Division is declared unconstitutional by the final and valid judgment or decree  
33 of any court of competent jurisdiction, this declaration of unconstitutionality or invalidity shall not  
34 affect any other part, section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, phrase, clause, term or  
35 word of this Division.  
36

37 (2) *Severability where less speech results.* This subsection shall not be interpreted to limit the effect of  
38 subsection (1), above, or any other applicable severability provision in the code of ordinances or any  
39 adopting ordinance. The Village Council specifically intends that severability shall be applied to these  
40 regulations even if the result would be to allow less speech in the Village, whether by subjecting  
41 currently exempt signs to permitting or by some other means.  
42

43 (3) *Severability of provisions pertaining to prohibited signs.* This subsection shall not be interpreted to limit  
44 the effect of subsection (1) above, or any other applicable severability provision in the code of  
45 ordinances or any adopting ordinance. The Village Council specifically intends that severability shall

1 be applied to the section entitled "Prohibited signs" so that each of the prohibited sign types listed in  
2 that section shall continue to be prohibited irrespective of whether another sign prohibition is  
3 declared unconstitutional or invalid.

4  
5 (4) *Severability of prohibition on off-premises signs.* This subsection shall not be interpreted to limit the  
6 effect of subsection (1) above, or any other applicable severability provision in the code of  
7 ordinances or any adopting ordinance. If any or all of this Division or any other provision of the  
8 Village's Code is declared unconstitutional or invalid by the final and valid judgment of any court of  
9 competent jurisdiction, the Village Council specifically intends that the declaration shall not affect  
10 the prohibition of off-premises signs, as provided under this Division.

11  
12 \* \* \*

13  
14 **30-90.10 SIGNS PERMITTED WITHOUT A SIGN PERMIT**

15  
16 (a) Within all zoning districts, the following signs, whether temporary or permanent,  
17 when not electrically illuminated shall be permitted and exempt from the requirement to obtain a  
18 sign permit.

19 \* \* \*

20  
21 (8) Personal expression signs limited to two per lot or parcel, or in the case of  
22 multi-family uses, one per dwelling unit, expressing personal views or opinions not  
23 exceeding 620 square inches ~~four square feet~~ in area, providing such signs are otherwise in  
24 compliance with applicable local, state and federal laws and displayed for a period of not  
25 more than 90 days in any year.

26  
27 \* \* \*

28 (15) Temporary political campaign signs announcing the candidacy of a candidate  
29 for public office not exceeding 620 square inches ~~22 inches by 28 inches~~ in size in residential  
30 zoning districts and six square feet in area in all other zoning districts. Setback and location  
31 shall be at least five feet from the official right-of-way and five feet from property under  
32 different ownership. Only one political campaign sign, per candidate, per street face is  
33 permitted. Political signs may be installed upon qualifying for office, or 90 days prior to the  
34 election, which ever date is longer.

35  
36 Temporary political campaign signs shall be removed within seven days after the last  
37 election or within seven (7) days of withdrawal of a candidate from running for elected  
38 office. If such signs are not removed within this period of time, the Village may remove such  
39 signs and may charge the candidate the actual cost for such removal. Failure to remove signs  
40 is a violation of this Code and is enforceable pursuant to the Village's code enforcement  
41 ordinance.

42 \* \* \*

43  
44 (17) Holiday and seasonal decorations shall not be construed as signs, providing that  
45 these contain no commercial advertising message, and further provided that such decoration

1 is not up more than 90 ~~60~~ days for a single holiday and is removed within seven (7) days  
2 after the holiday ends.

3  
4 \* \* \*

5  
6 Section 2. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this  
7 ordinance are repealed.

8  
9 Section 3. This ordinance shall be codified and included in the Code of Ordinances.

10  
11 Section 4. If any section, clause, sentence, or phrase of this ordinance is for any reason  
12 held invalid or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, the holding shall not affect the  
13 validity of the remaining portions of this ordinance.

14  
15 Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect immediately.

16  
17 PASSED AND ENACTED this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2011.

18  
19 Attest: \_\_\_\_\_  
20 Meighan Alexander Shelley Stanczyk  
21 Village Clerk Mayor

22  
23 APPROVED AS TO FORM:

24  
25 \_\_\_\_\_  
26 Eve A. Boutsis  
27 Village Attorney

28  
29 FINAL VOTE AT ADOPTION:

30  
31 Council Member Patrick Fiore \_\_\_\_\_  
32 Council Member Howard Tendrich \_\_\_\_\_  
33 Council Member Joan Lindsay \_\_\_\_\_  
34 Vice-Mayor Brian W. Pariser \_\_\_\_\_  
35 Mayor Shelley Stanczyk \_\_\_\_\_



1 WHEREAS, the Village's intent is to comply with Federal and State precedent, and comply  
2 with the unanimous decision of the US Supreme Court in 1994, in the matter *City of Ladue v. Gilleo*,  
3 512 US 43 (1994) as it relates to political signs and uniform time, manner, place restrictions and  
4 content neutrality; and,  
5

6 WHEREAS, the Mayor and Village Council desire to amend specific items in Division 30-  
7 90, entitled "Sign Regulations".  
8

9 BE IT ENACTED BY THE MAYOR AND VILLAGE COUNCIL OF THE VILLAGE  
10 OF PALMETTO BAY, FLORIDA, AS FOLLOWS:  
11

12 Section 1. Pursuant to the requirements of 30-30.7(b) of the Village's Code, the  
13 following text change is in compliance with the Village's Comprehensive Code and review criteria..  
14 The Village of Palmetto Bay hereby amends Division 90 of Chapter 30, entitled "Sign Regulations"  
15 which shall read as follows:  
16

17 \* \* \*

18 **DIVISION 30-90**

19 **SIGN REGULATIONS**

20 **SEC. 30-90.4. PURPOSE AND INTENT.**

21  
22  
23 (a) The Village Council recognizes that there are various persons and entities that have an interest  
24 in communicating with the public through the use of signs that serve to identify businesses and  
25 services, residences and neighborhoods, and also to provide for expression of opinions. The council  
26 is also responsible for furthering the Village's obligation to its residents and visitors to maintain a  
27 safe and aesthetically pleasing environment where signs do not create excessive visual clutter and  
28 distraction or hazards for pedestrians and vehicles; where signs do not adversely impact the  
29 predominantly residential character of the Village and where signs do not conflict with the natural  
30 and scenic qualities of the Village. These regulations are intended to ensure that permitted signs will  
31 not, because of size, location, method of construction, installation or manner of display endanger  
32 the public safety, create distractions that may jeopardize pedestrian or vehicular traffic safety;  
33 mislead, confuse or obstruct the vision of people seeking to locate or identify uses or premises; or  
34 destroy or impair visual qualities of the Village which is essential to general welfare and economic  
35 viability.  
36  
37

38  
39 It is the intent of the council that the regulations contained in this Division shall provide uniform  
40 sign criteria, which regulate the size, height, graphic character, lighting, number and placement of  
41 signs in a manner that is compatible to the scale and character of the Village, and which shall place  
42 the fewest possible restrictions on personal liberties, property rights, free commerce, and the free  
43 exercise of Constitutional rights, while achieving the Village's goal of creating a safe, healthy,  
44 attractive and aesthetically pleasing environment that does not contain excessive clutter or visual

1 distraction from right-of-ways and adjacent properties; the surrounding natural coastal environment  
2 and residential neighborhoods, and to ensure consistency with the Village's comprehensive plan.  
3

4 (b) *Scope.* The provisions of this Division shall govern the number, size, location, and character of  
5 all signs which may be permitted. No sign shall be permitted on a plot or parcel except in  
6 accordance with the provisions of this Division.  
7

8 (c) *Substitution of noncommercial speech for commercial speech.* Notwithstanding any provisions of this  
9 Division to the contrary, to the extent that this article permits a sign containing commercial copy, it  
10 shall permit a noncommercial sign to the same extent. The noncommercial message may occupy the  
11 entire sign area or any portion thereof, and may substitute for or be combined with the commercial  
12 message. The sign message may be changed from commercial to noncommercial messages, or from  
13 one noncommercial message to another, as frequently as desired by the sign's owner, provided that  
14 the sign is not prohibited, and the sign continues to comply with all requirements of this Division.  
15

16 (d) The Village may regulate the size, shape and location of temporary signs as content-neutral and  
17 reasonable "time, place and manner" restrictions on speech (federal review standard of First  
18 Amendment regulation of speech). At some point, the sheer number of signs do realistically impair  
19 the aesthetics of a neighborhood and provided the temporary residential signs are regulated  
20 uniformly as to the type, size, number, and location the local regulation would comply with strict  
21 scrutiny review of the Courts. Temporary and non-commercial signage can be provided a deadline  
22 on removal of the sign after the end of the "event" that triggers it; and, the Village recognizes that  
23 regulation of speech, must be treated in a "non-discriminatory," manner as other "noncommercial  
24 speech" that is highly scrutinized by the Courts. Moreover, the Village recognizes that campaign  
25 signs are a type of temporary sign, and their size, number, location, requirements for removal, and  
26 other aspects must be regulated uniformly with other speech, and it is the Village's intent is to  
27 comply with Federal and State precedent, and comply with the unanimous decision of the US  
28 Supreme Court in 1994, in the matter *City of Ladue v. Gilleo*, 512 US 43 (1994) as it relates to political  
29 signs and uniform time, manner, place restrictions and content neutrality.  
30

31 (ed) Severability.  
32

33 (1) *Generally.* If any part section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, phrase, clause,  
34 term or word of this Division is declared unconstitutional by the final and valid judgment or decree  
35 of any court of competent jurisdiction, this declaration of unconstitutionality or invalidity shall not  
36 affect any other part, section, subsection, paragraph, subparagraph, sentence, phrase, clause, term or  
37 word of this Division.  
38

39 (2) *Severability where less speech results.* This subsection shall not be interpreted to limit the effect of  
40 subsection (1), above, or any other applicable severability provision in the code of ordinances or any  
41 adopting ordinance. The Village Council specifically intends that severability shall be applied to these  
42 regulations even if the result would be to allow less speech in the Village, whether by subjecting  
43 currently exempt signs to permitting or by some other means.  
44

1 (3) *Severability of provisions pertaining to prohibited signs.* This subsection shall not be interpreted to limit  
2 the effect of subsection (1) above, or any other applicable severability provision in the code of  
3 ordinances or any adopting ordinance. The Village Council specifically intends that severability shall  
4 be applied to the section entitled "Prohibited signs" so that each of the prohibited sign types listed in  
5 that section shall continue to be prohibited irrespective of whether another sign prohibition is  
6 declared unconstitutional or invalid.

7  
8 (4) *Severability of prohibition on off-premises signs.* This subsection shall not be interpreted to limit the  
9 effect of subsection (1) above, or any other applicable severability provision in the code of  
10 ordinances or any adopting ordinance. If any or all of this Division or any other provision of the  
11 Village's Code is declared unconstitutional or invalid by the final and valid judgment of any court of  
12 competent jurisdiction, the Village Council specifically intends that the declaration shall not affect  
13 the prohibition of off-premises signs, as provided under this Division.

14  
15 \* \* \*

16  
17 **30-90.10 SIGNS PERMITTED WITHOUT A SIGN PERMIT**

18  
19 (a) Within all zoning districts, the following signs, whether temporary or permanent,  
20 when not electrically illuminated shall be permitted and exempt from the requirement to obtain a  
21 sign permit.

22 \* \* \*

23  
24 (8) Personal expression signs limited to two per lot or parcel, or in the case of  
25 multi-family uses, one per dwelling unit, expressing personal views or opinions not  
26 exceeding 620 square inches ~~four square feet~~ in area, providing such signs are otherwise in  
27 compliance with applicable local, state and federal laws and displayed for a period of not  
28 more than 90 days in any year.

29  
30 \* \* \*

31 (15) Temporary political campaign signs announcing the candidacy of a candidate  
32 for public office not exceeding 620 square inches ~~22 inches by 28 inches~~ in size in residential  
33 zoning districts and six square feet in area in all other zoning districts. Setback and location  
34 shall be at least five feet from the official right-of-way and five feet from property under  
35 different ownership. Only one political campaign sign, per candidate, per street face is  
36 permitted. Political signs may be installed upon qualifying for office, or 90 days prior to the  
37 election, which ever date is longer.

38  
39 Temporary political campaign signs shall be removed within seven days after the last  
40 election or within seven (7) days of withdrawal of a candidate from running for elected  
41 office. If such signs are not removed within this period of time, the Village may remove such  
42 signs and may charge the candidate the actual cost for such removal. Failure to remove signs  
43 is a violation of this Code and is enforceable pursuant to the Village's code enforcement  
44 ordinance.

\* \* \*

(17) Holiday and seasonal decorations shall not be construed as signs, providing that these contain no commercial advertising message, and further provided that such decoration is not up more than 90 ~~60~~ days for a single holiday and is removed within seven (7) days after the holiday ends.

\* \* \*

Section 2. All ordinances or parts of ordinances in conflict with the provisions of this ordinance are repealed.

Section 3. This ordinance shall be codified and included in the Code of Ordinances.

Section 4. If any section, clause, sentence, or phrase of this ordinance is for any reason held invalid or unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, the holding shall not affect the validity of the remaining portions of this ordinance.

Section 5. This ordinance shall take effect immediately.

PASSED AND ENACTED this \_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 2011.

Attest: \_\_\_\_\_  
Meighan Alexander  
Village Clerk  
Shelley Stanczyk  
Mayor

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

\_\_\_\_\_  
Eve A. Boutsis  
Village Attorney

FINAL VOTE AT ADOPTION:

Council Member Patrick Fiore \_\_\_\_\_  
Council Member Howard Tendrich \_\_\_\_\_  
Council Member Joan Lindsay \_\_\_\_\_  
Vice-Mayor Brian W. Pariser \_\_\_\_\_  
Mayor Shelley Stanczyk \_\_\_\_\_